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The FCC and "Pay Cable:" Promoting
Diversity on Television
by DAVID COURSEN*
I
Introduction
More than a decade ago, the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC)' sought to increase television's diversity by
freeing the emerging medium of pay cable 2 from rate regula-
tion.' As the Commission had hoped, subscriber-supported
* J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 1984; B.A., University of Oregon, 1970;
Member, Oregon State Bar. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable com-
ments and suggestions of David Novick, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Communica-
tions Law.
1. The FCC was created by the Communications Act of 1934, now codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-609, "[fIor the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio." Id. § 151.
2. A cable system is composed of an antenna, which picks up local and distant
broadcast signals, and cables, which transmit those signals to the home television sets
of the system's paying subscribers. A cable system may also transmit original pro-
grams through its cables to its subscribers. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025,
1029-30 (8th Cir. 1978), afd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Contemporary cable program services
are distributed by satellite to local cable systems throughout the country; such serv-
ices provide subscribers with programming choices that are not available on broadcast
television. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1983).
3. The basis for local government regulation of cable operations is that a cable
operator must string the system's cable on utility poles or use underground ducts or
cables. To do this, the operator generally needs an easement from the appropriate
authority. Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1981, at 77, 99. Thus,
[t] he ultimate dividing line ... [between local and federal regulatory author-
ity] rests on the distinction between reasonable regulations regarding use of
the streets and rights-of-way and the regulation of the operational aspects of
cable communications. The former is clearly within the jurisdiction of the
states and their political subdivisions. The latter, to the degree exercised, is
within the jurisdiction of this Commission.
Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to an In-
quiry on the Need for Additional Rules in the Area of Duplicative and Excessive Over-
Regulation of Cable Television, Report and Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 855, para. 21 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation]. For a broad over-
view of cable regulation, see Barnett, State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable
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program services 4 such as Home Box Office (HBO), Showtime,
and The Movie Channel flourished 5 in an unregulated market-
place. However, the Commission evidently failed to foresee
the emergence of a second type of cable programming, known
in the trade as basic cable service.6 Unlike pay services, basic
services do not receive a share of subscription fees, but sup-
port themselves primarily with advertising revenues.7 These
revenues increase with audience size, which, in turn, is likely
to be greater when rates are kept low by regulation. Basic
services are, therefore, better suited to a regulated environ-
ment than to an unregulated environment.8 Unfortunately, the
Commission has failed to distinguish advertiser-supported
from subscriber-supported services and, as a result, basic serv-
ices can sometimes be classified as pay cable and offered at
unregulated rates.9
In addition, the Commission's basic assumption in freeing
pay cable from rate regulation-that cable program services
will develop best in an unregulated marketplace '°-may be ob-
solete. As the cable industry has evolved, it has become in-
Television, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 685 (1972). See also infra notes 22-36 and accompany-
ing text.
4. A pay service such as The Movie Channel "is paid for by the subscriber who is
billed on a monthly basis for the service." WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note
2, at 37.
5. Annual subscriptions for the American pay television market now exceeds $2
billion. Mayer, Show Buyer for HBO is a Power in Pay TV, a 'Pain'in Hollywood, Wall
St. J., June 20, 1983, at 1, col. 1. There are now 23 million pay cable subscribers in the
United States. Girard, Pay TV's Fall Schedule: 'What's New' vs. Repeats, Variety, Aug.
15, 1983, at 50, col. 1.
6. In theory, a basic service provides cable system operators with programming
that is "offered free to subscribers of participating cable systems." WARNER COMMUNI-
CATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37. In practice, however, the term "basic service" is
amorphous and difficult to define precisely. See infra notes 37-52 and accompanying
text.
7. See, e.g., WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37 ("MTV: Music Tel-
evision is advertiser-supported.").
8. Basic services that are supported by advertising receive greater revenues
when their audiences increase. When a basic service charges system operators a fee
for carrying the service, that fee is generally a flat rate for each viewer; thus revenues
from this source, too, increase as the number of subscribers increases, regardless of
the rate the operator charges subscribers. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying
text.
9. The FCC's definition of pay cable excludes broadcast signal carriage and serv-
ices that are offered to all subscribers, but includes specialty programming for which
an extra charge is imposed. Clarification of the Cable Television Rules and Notice of
Proposed Rule Making and Inquiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, para. 32 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Clarification].
10. Id.
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creasingly dominated by a handful of large, vertically
integrated communications conglomerates that control both
cable program services and cable systems." Moreover, since
only one cable system operates in a particular area,12 the oper-
ator of each system has wide latitude in selecting which pro-
gram services to carry.'3 If the same conglomerate is offering
program services through one subsidiary and, through a sec-
ond, deciding which services to purchase,'14 the subsidiary op-
erating the cable system may have difficulty making
independent, unbiased decisions regarding which services will
best meet subscribers' needs.
This article considers the FCC's pay cable policies from two
different but related perspectives. It first discusses the
problems raised by the Commission's overly broad definition
of pay cable, and argues for a more precise definition that
would not prevent local regulation of rates for basic services.
The discussion then focuses on the growing vertical integration
in the cable industry, and concludes that program suppliers
should be prohibited from holding interests in cable systems.
In the current climate of born-again deregulatory fervor,15
neither policy may be fashionable, but if cable is to realize its
potential for fostering diversity on television, the FCC's man-
date to regulate in the public interest 6 may demand no less.
11. Virtually all of the major pay services, and several of the leading basic services,
are controlled by conglomerates that also own large multiple cable system operators
(MSOs). See infra notes 114-43 and accompanying text.
12. In practice, a cable system enjoys a natural monopoly in the area it serves. See
infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. One reason for this is that the expense of
constructing a cable system justifies permitting the operator to operate a system free
from competitors. A second reason is the need to obtain rights-of-way to install a cable
system. Note, Access and Pay Cable Rates: Off-Limits to Regulators After Midwest
Video II?, 16 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 591, 601 n.83 (1981).
13. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
15. S. 66, which sharply limits local regulation of cable and grants operators sub-
stantial assurance of franchise renewal and automatic cost of living increases passed
the Senate in June, 1983; a similar bill passed the Senate in 1982, but died in the House.
S. 66 Wins Big in the Senate, BROADCASTING, June 20, 1983, at 36.
16. "[T]he Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or ne-
cessity requires, shall ... generally encourage the larger and more effective use of
radio in the public interest ... ." 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 303(g).
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II
What Is Pay Cable?
A. The Rule
The FCC has had, at best, a checkered relationship with the
cable television industry. 7 After initially refusing to oversee
the industry, the Commission reluctantly embarked on the reg-
ulation of cable broadcasting in 1965,18 and in 1968 the Supreme
Court upheld the FCC's jurisdiction over cable. 19 Subse-
quently, the Commission subjected cable to highly restrictive
regulations ° and then progressively liberalized those
regulations.2'
In 1971, the Commission preempted the field of pay televi-
sion cablecasting, although it had not yet undertaken a com-
prehensive review of pay cable.22 The Commission
subsequently permitted local authorities to regulate rates for
basic cable television services,23 but precluded all local rate
regulation of the "new medium" of pay television 24 and de-
clined to regulate rates for pay television itself. The FCC ex-
plained the rationale for this policy in the following terms:
After considerable study of the emerging cable industry and
its prospects for introducing new and innovative communica-
tions services, we have concluded that, at this time, there
should be no regulation of rates for such services at all by any
governmental level. Attempting to impose rate regulation on
17. For an example of one of the numerous studies of FCC regulation of cable tele-
vision, see Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting
and Cable Television, Report, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, paras. 31-68 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Inquiry].
18. Brookhaven Cable TV Inc. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. 1216, 1218 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
19. There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commission's
authority to regulate [cable television]. It is enough to emphasize that the
authority which we recognize today under § 152(a) [of the Communications
Act] is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of
the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting. The Commission may, for these purposes, issue "such rules and
regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent
with law," as "public convenience, interest or necessity requires." 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(r). We express no views as to the Commission's authority, if any, to reg-
ulate [cable] under any other circumstances or for any other purposes.
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
20. Inquiry, supra note 17, at paras. 48-52.
21. Id. para. 56.
22. Brookhaven Cable TV Inc. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. at 1219.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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specialized services that have not yet developed would not
only be premature but would in all likelihood have a chilling
effect on the anticipated development. This is precisely what
we are trying to avoid.25
The Commission defined its intentions more explicitly in
1975, citing the inability of conventional television to "cater to
minority tastes and interests,"26 and stressing the importance
of promoting "the development of new technologies which
promise viewing diversity. '27 Because cable television is not
dependent on advertiser support and has access to an abun-
dant supply of channels, it is, the Commission added, "particu-
larly able to program for audiences with specialized
interests. 2
8
Local jurisdiction to regulate rates was to be limited to "reg-
ular subscriber service,"29 which the Commission defined as
"that service regularly provided to all subscribers."30 This in-
cluded "all broadcast signal carriage and all ... required ac-
cess channels including origination programming,"'" but
excluded "specialized programming for which a per-program
or per-channel charge is made.132 The aim of this rule was to
focus regulatory responsibility on regular subscription rates
without promoting any other type of rate regulation.33 This
regulatory approach was upheld as preempting local rate regu-
lation of special pay cable programming in Brookhaven Cable
TV Inc. v. Kelly.34 That decision overturned a New York statu-
tory scheme 35 creating a State Commission on Cable Televi-
sion with power to regulate rates for both basic and pay cable
television. 6
25. Clarification, supra note 9, para. 85.
26. Amendment of Part 76, Subpart G, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Pertaining to the Cablecasting of Programs for Which a Per Program or Per Channel
Charge Is Made, First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 145 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as First Report and Order].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Clarification, supra note 9, para. 84.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 428 F. Supp. 1216 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), a.fd, 573 F.2d 765 (2d. Cir. 1978).
35. N.Y. ExEc. LAw art. 28, §§ 811-831 (McKinney 1982).
36. Brookhaven Cable TV Inc. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. at 1220.
No. 41
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B. The Commission's Interpretation
When the FCC originally preempted pay cable rate regula-
tion, it did not specify how broadly preemption was to apply.
The Commission precluded local regulation of rates for pro-
gramming for which a separate charge is imposed. 7 However,
it did not indicate whether rate preemption should apply only
to services that are invariably subject to such a charge, as is
the case with a typical pay service such as The Movie Chan-
nel. 8 An alternative approach would be to preempt rate regu-
lation whenever an additional charge is imposed for any
service, pay or basic. The Commission has recently adopted
this second approach,39 which apparently permits a system op-
erator to bootstrap a regulated basic service into an unregu-
lated pay service by offering it as part of a "tier" or package of
services available only to subscribers who pay an additional
fee.40 As a result, the same service may be offered as part of a
basic package, subject to rate regulation on some systems, and
as a part of a pay tier, free of rate regulations on others.
By holding that rates for both pay and basic services can be
kept beyond the authority of local rate regulators, the FCC has
failed to recognize the problematic relationship between the
two types of services. On the one hand, basic services provide
specialized programming"1 that adds to television's diversity
by supplementing conventional programming, a role the FCC
envisioned for pay cable.42 On the other hand, most basic serv-
ices are advertiser-supported,43 and, as the term "basic ser-
vice" suggests, are intended to be provided free to anyone
paying the basic cable subscription rate." Neither characteris-
tic is compatible with "pay cable" as originally defined by the
FCC.4" Moreover, although basic services do not originate as
broadcast signals, 46 they are, in most other respects, indistin-
guishable from "superstations" such as WTBS, Atlanta. WTBS
37. Clarification, supra note 9, para. 84.
38. See supra note 4.
39. In re Community Cable TV, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1204 (1984).
40. Id. paras. 19-21.
41. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
42. First Report and Order, supra note 26, para. 145.
43. Cable's Programming Cornucopia in the Sky, BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 50.
44. See, e.g., WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37 (Basic services,
Music Television, and Nickelodeon "are offered free to subscribers of participating
cable systems.").
45. See Clarification, supra note 9, at 199.
46. See WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37.
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originates as a broadcast signal, but like a cable service, is dis-
tributed nationally by satellite." It is listed as a basic service
in the trade press, 48 makes a per-home charge to systems car-
rying it,49 is programmed and promoted as a cable service, and
sets advertising rates on the basis of its cable audience. 0 As a
broadcast station, WTBS is clearly beyond the FCC's original
definition of pay cable, 51 and still cannot be treated as a pay
service on some cable systems.52
Courts that have addressed the subject of pay cable have
likewise failed to confront the differences between pay and ba-
sic services.5 3 No court has directly considered whether it is
the nature of the service or the cable system operator's deci-
sion to charge an additional fee that determines whether a ser-
vice is pay cable. Courts have discussed pay cable in contexts
that are only marginally relevant to this question,54 and have
defined it as a specialized service for which a per channel or
per program charge is made in addition to the subscription and
installation fees, 55 or as programming acquired by the cable
system directly from the copyright holder and resold to sub-
scribers.5 6 One court discussed pay television virtually with-
out a definition, evidently assuming that the term is generally
understood to refer to subscriber-supported services such as
47. See Besen & Crandall, supra note 3, at 108.
48. See BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 52.
49. Bierbaum, Cable Dropping Super-Stations, Variety, Mar. 16, 1983, at 1, col. 2, at
194.
50. Id.
51. See Clarification, supra note 9, para. 84.
52. In those cable systems where WTBS is not a distant signal imported to the
system by satellite, it remains a mandatory part of basic service, subject to local rate
regulation. See In re Community Cable TV, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d paras. 15-17.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a 22 page opinion discussing the pay cable industry in considerable
detail, but mentioning only a single basic service).
54. Courts have discussed pay cable, for example, in the contexts of the royalty
rates paid by cable operators retransmitting broadcast programming (National Cable
TV v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1982)), FCC rules regarding
the importation of distant signals (Malrite TV of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.
1981)), and the right of pay services to acquire programming on an exclusive basis
(Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Similarly, in Brookha-
yen, there was no question of regulating the rates for a basic service; the issue was
regulating rates for HBO. Brookhaven Cable TV Inc. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. at 1218.
55. Malrite TV of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d at 1151 n.14; Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
587 F.2d at 1250 n.1.
56. National Cable TV v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d at 1079 n.12.
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 6
HBO, Showtime, and The Movie Channel.57
Thus, the FCC's decision to limit local authority to regulate
rates for basic cable services was not an inevitable corollary to
the decision to preclude rate regulation for pay services. On
the contrary, it appears that the policies the Commission
sought to promote by protecting pay cable from rate regulation
might have been better served by permitting, or even encour-
aging, local regulation of rates for basic services.
III
Rate Regulation
A. Diversity
The primary purpose of the regulation exemption was to pro-
tect the pay cable industry from over-regulation that might sti-
fle its development and thus prevent it from providing the kind
of diverse programming the FCC envisioned 8 Free from rate
regulation, the pay cable industry has grown rapidly 9 and has
become increasingly dominated by a handful of large, very
profitable entities. 0 Indeed, HBO alone poses such a threat to
other companies in the industry that it has forced even rela-
tively successful competitors to seek additional financial sup-
port.6' It is so powerful that it is virtually able to dictate the
57. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412 (en-
joining film studios from starting pay service).
58. Brookhaven Cable TV Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d at 767.
59. "The [pay television] industry is in the midst of a boom that is causing some
radical changes in its present structure." United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 507 F. Supp. at 422. Pay television's growth "skyrocketed" between 1980 and 1981.
Girard, Pay TV Hasn't Hurt Growth of Theatrical B. 0., Variety, Mar. 16, 1983, at 1, col. 5,
at 194. The pay industry is currently growing so rapidly that subscriber counts for the
larger services are dated almost before they appear, and thus are illustrative rather
than factually accurate. Compare Bedell, Pay TV Challenges the Networks, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 3, 1983, Arts & Leisure Section, at 1, col. 1, at 25 (HBO subscriber figure of 12 mil-
lion and 1982 Showtime subscriber figure of three million) with BROADCASTING, May 3,
1982, at 52 (HBO's subscriber figure of 8.5 million less than a year earlier and Show-
time's more recent subscriber figure of four million). But see Time's Video Group Re-
ports Earnings Slide, BROADCASTING, July 23, 1984, at 108 (profitability and subscriber
growth of HBO and Cinemax declined in the second quarter of 1984).
60. HBO projected 1982 profits of $100 million, Liebowitz Bullish on Cable; More
Restrained on Broadcast Stocks, BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at 76, on a profit margin
of approximately 20%, BROADCASTING, Nov. 15, 1982, at 48. Showtime's 1983 profits are
expected to be in the $30-40 million range. Showtime-Movie Channel Merger Raises
Many Questions, BROADCASTING, Jan. 17, 1983, at 42.
61. HBO and Cinemax, both owned by Time, Inc. together account for two-thirds
of the American pay television market. Mayer, supra note 5. The Movie Channel,
which recently began to operate at a profit, Pay Cable: A Moving Target, BROADCAST-
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terms on which it purchases programming from suppliers.62
The growth of the pay industry has not, however, led to di-
versity. HBO and Showtime, although competitors, are in
some respects no more distinct than the commercial broadcast
networks.63 Until recently, both pay cable services attracted
audiences primarily by showing recent theatrical motion pic-
tures not yet shown on broadcast television.6 4 As the two serv-
ices develop original programming, the emphasis is now on
made-for-cable movies and on continuing series that have been
cancelled by the broadcast networks such as "The Paper
Chase," which was canceled by CBS in 1979.65 Not surpris-
ingly, differentiating themselves from one another is a signifi-
cant problem for the major pay services.6 6 In fact, the entire
universe of major pay cable services consists of HBO, Show-
time, two movie services (The Movie Channel and Cinemax),67
the Disney Channel (owned by Walt Disney Productions,
which also owns a film studio),68 and the Playboy Channel
(which specializes in mildly erotic movies and programs).69
ING, Nov. 22, 1982, at 63, has agreed to merge with Showtime, largely to permit the two
to compete more effectively with HBO. Justice Agency Approves Pay-TVMerger After
2 Distributors Removed as Investors, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1983, at 8, col. 1. The Justice
Department, after initially opposing the merger, dropped its opposition when two film
studios, Paramount and Universal, withdrew from the venture.
62. By virtue of its size, HBO receives a discount per subscriber for film licenses.
It was partly in order to change this favored treatment that Universal, Paramount,
Twentieth Century Fox, Columbia, and Getty Oil attempted to establish Premiere, the
pay service that was enjoined in United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F.
Supp. 412. BROADCASTING, Nov. 22, 1982, at 63. With more than $1 billion invested in
the feature films it either rents or produces, HBO is by far the largest financier of mov-
ies in the United States. Mayer, supra note 5.
63. See Bedell, supra note 59, at 25.
64. "The great success in pay television, and the driving force in its growth, has
been the new, theatrical movie, never before shown on television." United States v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. at 416.
65. Bedell, supra note 59, at 25.
66. "Regardless of whether there is a lot of duplication among the pay services,
... consumers perceive there is and are not buying as before." BROADCASTING, May 3,
1982, at 40. This may be partly because the pay services tend to use similar approaches
to programming. For example, HBO and Showtime are both developing "the kind of
series that have long been the backbone of network schedules," and both "rely on in-
tensive market research to track the tastes of subscribers, and they tailor their plans
accordingly." Bedell, supra note 59, at 25.
67. See BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 49, 52. Cinemax has recently begun to offer a
few programs other than movies. Bitterness Erupts Among Pay-cablers Over Feevee
Films, Variety, Aug. 24, 1983, at 45, col. 1.
68. WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1983).
69. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 49.
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Other types of pay programming have been attempted, 0 but no
other service has yet attracted significantly more than one per-
cent of the total pay audience.7
If pay cable has, to date, failed to produce the kind of diver-
sity the FCC envisioned, basic cable is virtually predicated on
diversity.72 Among the various basic cable services currently
available are a weather service,7 3 two all-news services,74 an
all-sports service, 5 a country music service, 6 several religious
services,77  a "housewife" consumer information service,78 a
children's program service,7 9 a video rock music service,8" and
even a part-time fine arts/culture service.8
For all its diversity, basic cable is still very much an emerg-
ing medium, with services frequently appearing and disap-
pearing.8 2  For example, a full-time fine arts/culture service,
70. Bravo, which specializes in performing arts programming and international
films, id., has slightly more than 200,000 subscribers, but is growing rapidly. BROAD-
CASTING, June 4, 1984, at 64. An earlier, well-publicized attempt at a "culture" pay cable
service, The Entertainment Channel, attracted few subscribers and was abandoned
after losing $50 million in a few months of operation. Too Few Takers, TIME, Mar. 7,
1983, at 69.
71. BROADCASTING, June 4, 1984, at 64.
72. Virtually every basic service "picks an audience segment and goes after it."
BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 50. The fact that a medium that depends primarily on
advertising dollars, and thus tends to seek a large audience, should do so by offering
programming aimed specifically at narrow audiences may be one reason basic services
have had trouble attracting advertising dollars. See Quinn, It's the Program that
Counts, Not Distribution System: Pierce, Variety, Mar. 9,1983, at 44, col. 2 (fragmenta-
tion of audience a problem of cable); id. at 116 (cable is negligible competitor of broad-
cast networks for advertising dollars).
73. The Weather Channel. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 50.
74. Cable News Network (CNN) and CNN Headline. Id. A third news service, the
Satellite News Channel (SNC), recently ceased operating after it was purchased by
Turner Broadcasting, which owns CNN and CNN Headline. Beermann, Ted Turner
Gobbles Up SNC, ABC-Group W Can't Hack It, Sell Out For $12.5-Mil Each, Variety,
Oct. 12, 1983, at 59, col. 5.
75. ESPN. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 50.
76. The Nashville Network. Nashville Goes Cross-Country, BROADCASTING, Mar.
14, 1983, at 146.
77. These include the Christian Broadcast Network (CBN), People That Love
(PTL), the Trinity Broadcasting Network, and The Eternal World Television Network
(EWTN). BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 52.
78. The Modern Satellite Network (MSN). Id. at 50.
79. Nickelodeon. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37.
80. Music Television (MTV). Id.
81. ARTS. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 52.
82. In late 1981, there were 25 basic services available to cable systems. The Cable
Numbers According to Broadcasting, BROADCASTING, Nov. 30, 1981, at 36. Six months
later, there were 35 such services; two of the original services were no longer available,
and 11 new services were. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 52.
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CBS Cable,83 was abandoned in 198284 after losing some $40
million in its first year of operation.85 The cost of launching a
major service has been estimated at $100 million.86 No major
service is yet profitable.87 Moreover, some of the best-estab-
lished services are losing enormous sums of money.88 In short,
as an infant medium that holds the promise of tremendous di-
versity, basic cable provides precisely the sort of programming
that the FCC sought to foster by exempting pay cable from lo-
cal rate regulation.89
B. Program Suppliers v. System Operators
Unfortunately, freedom from rate regulation is neither ap-
propriate to, nor likely to foster the development of, basic serv-
ices. The basic assumption on which the rate regulation
exemption implicitly rested-that the unregulated market is
the best mechanism for setting the price for a cable service 9 -
applies only if the interests of the program supplier and the
cable operator are identical. With traditional pay cable, this
assumption is valid; suppliers receive a percentage, generally
about forty percent of the income the cable system collects for
the service.9 As a result, both the supplier and the operator
are interested in finding a profit-maximizing rate for the
service.
By contrast, most suppliers of basic services either are not
paid for their programs 92 or receive a flat payment for each
subscriber.93 Thus, they have no interest in the subscription
83. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 52.
84. TIME, Mar. 7, 1983, at 69.
85. Cable: Coming to Terms With Adulthood, BROADCASTING, Jan. 3, 1983, at 74.
86. See, e.g., BROADCASTING, Nov. 22, 1982, at 62.
87. Of the advertiser-supported services on the air, only one, CNN, is approaching
the break-even point. TIME, Mar. 7, 1983, at 69. The timetable for CNN's achieving
profitability is continually being pushed back, and the service has only survived be-
cause of the infusion of revenues from WTBS into CNN. Beermann, Webs to Turner:
Get Lost, Variety, Mar. 2, 1983, at 325, col. 2.
88. ESPN, after four years in operation, has yet to show a profit, and its 1982 losses
were projected at $20 million. BROADCASTING, Nov. 22, 1982, at 60.
89. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
90. See Clarification, supra note 9, at 200.
91. BROADCASTING, Sept. 6, 1982, at 8.
92. See, e.g., WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37.
93. Beginning in 1979, ESPN received four cents for each subscriber, but recently,
recognizing that advertising revenues alone could not support it, the service an-
nounced plans to raise that charge to 13 cents per subscriber. Beermann, Sports Chan-
nels: ESPN to Raise Affil. Fee, Variety, June 15, 1983, at 36, col. 4. CNN charges
operators 15 cents per subscriber. BROADCASTING, Sept. 6, 1982, at 8. When it did not
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rate. Instead, most basic services are advertiser-supported; 94
their reserves depend on the number of viewers they can de-
liver to advertisers. As long as more persons will purchase ba-
sic service when the rate is lower, the interests of program
suppliers will be in keeping subscription rates as low as possi-
ble, which presumably is what regulators attempt to do. The
system operator, however, seeks to charge the most profitable
rate rather than the lowest rate.
The Commission apparently did not foresee a conflict be-
tween the interests of program suppliers and system opera-
tors;95 however, it was primarily concerned with the interests
of the former. For example, the FCC specifically declared that
its policies were designed to foster the development of "spe-
cialized services."9 This implies a greater concern for the in-
terests of the program supplier, who creates such services,
than for the system operator, who merely carries what is avail-
able. Moreover, if the Commission's primary concern had been
to maximize the profits of system operators, it would have pre-
cluded rate regulation of any kind; in fact, local authorities are
permitted to regulate basic cable rates.9
There is also a strong equitable argument for permitting reg-
ulation of the rates charged for basic services. It seems funda-
mentally unfair to permit operators to charge unregulated
rates for services provided to them when the explicit expecta-
tion was that the services would be offered free to all subscrib-
ers.98 This argument becomes even more compelling if the
accept advertising, Nickelodeon charged operators between 10 cents and 15 cents per
subscriber, a rate that will soon be adjusted to be identical to the fee imposed for MTV;
both fees will be "in line with" those charged by other services, or about 20 cents per
subscriber. Warner Amex to charge for MTV, put spots on Nickelodeon, BROADCAST-
ING, May 23, 1983, at 34.
Thus, a system offering a variety of basic services could pay a considerable monthly
sum for those services. Whether or not the rates for such services are regulated, sys-
tem operators should be able to pass these costs along to subscribers. But see infra
note 99.
94. See supra note 7.
95. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
96. Clarification, supra note 9, para. 85.
97. Id. para. 84. But see supra note 15.
98. See, e.g., WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37 (MTV and Nickelo-
deon "are offered free to subscribers of participating cable systems."). Basic services
are, however, sold with the understanding that some operators may charge an extra
fee for them, and that there is little the services can do to stop the practice. For a time,
ESPN offered to pay compensation to systems that did not put the service on a pay
tier. Beermann, supra note 93.
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operator succeeds in extracting some form of compensation
from the program supplier for carrying the service.99
A broad definition of pay cable would subvert another Com-
mission policy as well. The FCC noted that its pay-rate pre-
emption was partially intended to preclude a "confusing"'100
system of dual federal and local pay cable regulation. But an
analogous, equally confusing system of dual regulation is inev-
itable if the same service is offered as pay (and unregulated)
on one cable system, and as basic (and regulated) on another.
C. Preemption Analysis
The FCC's authority to free pay cable from local rate regula-
tion ultimately rests on its power, as a federal agency, to pre-
empt state law.' 0' Preemption is based on the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, 02 which directs that
when federal and state law conflict, state law must yield to fed-
eral law.0 3 The Supreme Court has tended to restrict the pre-
99. With supply high and demand low (many systems that are filled to the
brim with programming), many cable operators are taking advantage of their
market position to extract, as one partner put it, "the last ounce of blood"
[from program suppliers] in the form of upfront payments, launch support
assistance, co-op advertising dollars, and forgiveness of subscriber fees.
BROADCASTING, Sept. 6, 1982, at 8. The most direct form of carriage payment is proba-
bly that made by SIN TV network, which directly pays affiliates according to the
number of Spanish surnames among subscribers. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 54.
Other forms of compensation are generally less direct. Group W reportedly paid up to
85 cents per subscriber per service to systems that added both the Satellite News
Channel and The Nashville Network, two program services it distributed. BROADCAST-
ING, Nov. 29, 1982, at 8. CNN turns over one minute of advertising time per hour to
systems that take a companion service, CNN Headline, which is available free to sys-
tems subscribing to CNN. BROADCASTING, Sept. 26, 1982, at 8. CBN reportedly in-
creased its subscriber base by promising to buy back unused local advertising time
from affiliates. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 15. ESPN turns over approximately
30% of its total commercial time to local affiliates. Cable affiliates: taking a group
approach to negotiating with networks, BROADCASTING, Mar. 8,1982, at 146. This local
advertising time can be abundant; a cable system carrying four ad-supported cable
networks gets about 150,000 30-second spots to sell locally each year. BROADCASTING,
Dec. 6, 1982, at 8. The Tulsa, Oklahoma cable system operator has utilized local availa-
bilities to sell $1 million of advertising per year, which equals about $10 per subscriber.
BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 47. That figure is expected to double within a few years.
Id.
100. Brookhaven Cable TV Inc. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. at 1219.
101. See supra note 3. See also supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
102. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
103. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
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emption doctrine to those areas in which its application is
unavoidable. 10 4 Thus, preemption analysis is said to start with
the assumption that the state's police powers are not to be su-
perseded by federal law unless "that was the clear and mani-
fest purpose of Congress,' ' 05 or unless the conflict between
federal and state law is so direct that the two cannot be recon-
ciled.1 6 A federal regulation should preempt state law only
where the nature of the regulated subject permits no other
conclusion or where Congress has unmistakably ordained pre-
emption. 07 Similarly, a federal law preempts a state law when
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."108
In determining whether there is a conflict, courts should con-
sider the relationship between state and federal laws as they
are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written. 09
This language seems to mandate a narrow definition of pay
cable. A broad definition would expand the scope of preemp-
tion, increasing the area of potential conflict between local reg-
ulation and the federal rule, without advancing the avowed
federal policy of promoting diversity. Conversely, a narrow def-
inition would reduce the area of potential conflict between
state and federal law, the course the Court has preferred to
follow.
Moreover, the FCC itself has expressed a preference for nar-
row, rather than broad, preemption of cable regulation, re-
stricting preemption to specific subject areas, and eschewing
total preemption." 0 This precise approach allows the Commis-
104. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (state prohibition of hiring illegal
aliens not preempted by federal government's exclusive power to regulate
immigration).
105. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
106. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937).
107. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
108. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
109. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
110. [W]e have taken the approach of subject-matter preemption rather than
the broad-brush approach ... of total premption .... [W]e think that the
benefits derived, especially from local determination of the franchisee, to date,
have outweighed the liabilities of such an approach.
Since we have adopted a subject-matter approach to the allocation of regula-
tory responsibility over cable television, we are afforded significant flexibility
in tailoring our rules as we watch this dynamic industry grow. We can re-
spond to new developments quickly and we can correct past mistakes without
disrupting the entire regulatory scheme.
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sion to utilize local regulation in appropriate areas, to shape
rules tailored to the growth of the industry, to respond to new
developments, and to correct past mistakes without disrupting
the entire regulatory scheme.111 These policies, too, are more
consistent with a narrow definition of pay cable.
Compelling arguments, therefore, support a narrow con-
struction of pay cable. Permitting rate regulation for services
that are not subscriber-supported would foster the develop-
ment of such services and promote the FCC goal of increasing
the diversity of television programming. In addition, a narrow
definition of pay cable would avoid unnecessary federal en-
croachment on state regulatory authority.
IV
Vertical Integration and Diversity
Another potential problem with a broad definition of pay
cable is that it could permit discriminatory pricing of compet-
ing services. Specifically, a cable system operator could pro-
vide a favored service to all subscribers, while limiting a
competing service to the smaller audience willing to pay an ad-
ditional, unregulated fee. 112 Arguably, however, such discrimi-
natory pricing would probably be rare, since it would be far
more effective simply to refrain from carrying the disfavored
service at all." 3
If the problem of discriminatory pricing is of marginal impor-
tance, the larger problem of cable systems granting preferen-
tial treatment to favored services is not. On the contrary, the
vertical integration of the cable industry makes such favorit-
ism virtually inevitable. Several conglomerates have subsidi-
aries that create and distribute program services, and other
subsidiaries that operate cable systems." 4 This creates a po-
tential conflict between the interests of the conglomerate,
which seeks to sell its own services as widely as possible, and
Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation, supra note 3, paras. 24, 26.
111. Id.
112. Group W Cable's Eugene, Oregon system provided SNC free to all subscribers,
while restricting CNN to those subscribers paying an extra three-dollar charge for a
special program tier of basic services. Great Home Entertainment, Group W Cable,
Eugene, Oregon, service brochure.
113. Until the CNN/SNC merger, Group W Cable's Eugene, Oregon system did not
offer CNN Headline, id., a headline news service that competed directly with SNC. See
BROADCASTING, Sept. 6, 1982, at 8.
114. See infra notes 115 and 122.
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the interests of cable subscribers, who may desire competing
services.
In the pay cable industry, vertical integration, by which the
same conglomerate controls a pay program service and a large
multiple system cable operator (MSO), is almost universal." 5
Since it is more profitable for an operator to carry a service
with which it is financially linked," 6 the corporate connection
115. The largest pay service, HBO, with 12 million subscribers, Bedell, supra note
59, at 1, and a companion service, Cinemax, with 1.5 million subscribers, BROADCAST-
ING, May 3, 1982, at 52, are both owned by Time, Inc., The Top 100, BROADCASTING, Jan. 4,
1982, at 39, 70. Time, Inc. also owns ATC, id., the nation's second largest MSO and the
operator with the largest number of pay subscribers, BROADCASTING, June 13, 1983, at
68. The number two pay service, Showtime, with four million subscribers, Bedell,
supra note 59, at 1, is partly owned by Viacom, BROADCASTING, Nov. 22, 1982, at 63, the
eleventh largest MSO, BROADCASTING, June 13, 1983, at 68; until recently, the third larg-
est MSO, Group W Cable, id., had a half interest in Showtime, BROADCASTING, May 3,
1982, at 49. The third pay service, The Movie Channel, id., with 2.2 million subscribers,
WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37, is owned by Warner Amex, id.,
which also owns the fifth largest MSO, BROADCASTING, June 13, 1983, at 68. Recently,
Showtime and The Movie Channel agreed to merge. See supra note 61. The next larg-
est full-time pay service, Spotlight, BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 52, with 750,000 sub-
scribers, is owned by four large MSOs: Cox, Storer, TCI, and Times Mirror, Spotlight
on Group W, Variety, Apr. 6, 1983, at 40, col. 2 (discussing Group W's possible acquisi-
tion of an interest in Spotlight). Three MSOs have interests in the Playboy/Escapade
service. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 49.
The failure of the culturally oriented Entertainment Channel, a joint venture of RCA
and Rockefeller Center, Inc., see Loftus, Economy K.O. 's Another Cabler, Variety, Feb.
23, 1983, at 1, col. 2, neither of which is a cable operator, was due in large part to its
inability to compete with the larger, better-established services. Id. at 78 ("TEC found
itself in the middle of an all-out war between the HBO-Cinemax combine against the
Showtime-Movie Channel axis, both backed by heavy hitters, both spending millions
in an attempt to blow the other out of the water. TEC was nothing more than a sitting
duck [sic]."). TEC's chairman, Arthur Taylor, claims that TEC's failure was partly
caused by its inability to gain access to Manhattan Cable in New York. Brewin, The
News Battle: Full Court Press, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 15, 1983, at 18. Time, Inc. owns
Manhattan Cable, which carries Time's two pay services, HBO and Cinemax. Id.
The Disney Channel, owned by Walt Disney Productions, which is not an MSO, lost
$28.3 million in the six months of operation following its introduction in April 1983.
WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, supra note 68, at 37, 41. The Disney Channel was origi-
nally planned as a joint venture with Group W, but joint venture discussions were
discontinued in September 1982. WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, Securities and Exchange
Commission Form 10-K for Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1982, File No. 1-4083, at 4. The
service has grown rapidly and now has over one million subscribers. BROADCASTING,
June 4, 1984, at 64. The Disney Channel has access to the Disney library of feature
films, cartoons, shorts, and television shows, WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS, supra note
68, at 22, and the Disney name is familiar to a wide audience, two factors that appar-
ently make the service unique. As a result, its successful entry into the pay market-
place without the support of a large MSO would appear to be an anomaly.
116. By operating a service themselves, a group of MSOs can "cut out the middle-
man's costs---costs which are anything but light." BROADCASTING, Sept. 6, 1982, at 56
(discussing the rapid growth of Spotlight; that growth has since slowed). See also Va-
riety, Apr. 6, 1983, at 40.
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often influences decisions concerning which services will be
carried. The most extreme example of this was the rapid
growth of Spotlight. When the service was initiated, its owner,
Times-Mirror, Inc., simply ceased offering competing services
to 210,000 subscribers, 1 7 thereby permitting Spotlight to cap-
ture 150,000 subscribers from HBO and 40,000 from Show-
time."8 After Cox Cable acquired an interest in Spotlight, it
stopped offering HBO, Cinemax, The Movie Channel, or Show-
time to a total of 215,000 subscribers." 9 In fact, most of Spot-
light's growth was a result of "switchouts," system-wide
substitutions of one service for another.120 The joint venture
formed following the merger of Showtime and The Movie
Channel has acquired Spotlight,'12 presumably paying, at least
in part, for access to its own "switched-out" former
subscribers.
Although vertical integration is not as pervasive among basic
services, it is far from negligible. 122 Corporate links apparently
affect the basic services that are carried on some systems. For
example, Group W, which formerly operated SNC 23 and was
planning a second news service, 24 allegedly refused to carry
Cable News Network (CNN) or CNN Headline on most of its
systems. 25 This pattern was so pervasive that CNN instituted
legal action to gain increased access to Group W systems,
126
asserting that "'SNC and Group W are using their combined
power as programmer and exhibitor to prevent CNN from com-
peting with SNC in certain cable systems owned by Group
W." ,,127 This particular problem was eventually resolved when
117. BROADCASTING, Sept. 6, 1982, at 56.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. BROADCASTING, Dec. 19, 1983, at 37.
122. Time, Inc. owns one-third of the USA Network. BROADCASTING, Jan. 4, 1982, at
70. Group W Satellite, which, like Group W Cable, is a subsidiary of Westinghouse, id.,
was part-owner of SNC until that service was sold to Turner Broadcasting. Beermann,
supra note 74, at 59. Group W Satellite also markets the Nashville Network for WSM,
Inc. BROADCASTING, Mar. 14, 1983, at 146. Viacom has an interest in the Cable Health
Network, see BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 50, which recently merged with ABC/
Hearsts's basic service, Daytime, see BROADCASTING, June 20, 1983, at 37. Warner Amex
owns Nickelodeon and MTV. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37.
123. See BROADCASTING, Nov. 29, 1982, at 8.
124. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 50.
125. Turner's Antitrust Challenge Hits a Raw Nerve at Group W, Variety, Mar. 9,
1983, at 52, col. 5.
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting a CNN statement).
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Turner Broadcasting, which owns CNN, purchased SNC from
Group W and its co-owner ABC for $25 million, a price paid
largely for access to SNC subscribers. 28
To understand the magnitude of the problem of vertical inte-
gration, it is important to recognize that a cable operator has a
natural monopoly over the carriage of signals in a specific
area; 129 there are very few communities in the United States in
which the same household has access to more than one cable
system. 130  In addition, although newer systems have the ca-
pacity to carry large numbers of channels,'13 most older sys-
tems have only a limited channel capacity; 32 five years ago,
virtually all cable systems were limited to twelve channels, and
even today such systems serve more than twenty percent of all
cable subscribers. 33 Thus, a system operator who generally
decides what services to carry13 4 has considerable control over
the programming that reaches subscribers,' 3 particularly on a
twelve-channel system. 36
128. Each SNC partner (ABC Video Enterprises and Group W Broadcasting and
Cable) will get $12.5 million in cash when the deal is closed October 27. At that time
SNC will go off line. None of the equipment for SNC operated by Group W Satellite
Communications is involved, making Turner Broadcasting's purchase of SNC a de
facto subscriber buyout. See Beermann, supra note 74, at 59.
129. Noam, Toward an Integrated Communications Market: Overcoming the Local
Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COM. L.J. 209, 211 (1982). In a seminal discussion
of the subject, a natural monopoly has been defined in the following terms:
If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost
by one firm rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly,
whatever the actual number of firms in it. If such a market contains more than
one firm, either the firms will quickly shake down to one through mergers or
failures, or production will continue to consume more resources than neces-
sary. In the first case competition is short-lived, and in the second it produces
inefficient results. Competition is thus not a viable regulatory mechanism
under conditions of natural monopoly.
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969). A cable
system operator fits this description. Berkin, Hit Or Myth? The Cable TV Marketplace,
Diversity and Regulation, 35 FED. COM. L.J. 41, 61-66 (1983). See also supra note 12.
130. Note, supra note 12, at 601 n.83.
131. "The new systems typically have at least thirty channels, and some have fifty
or more." United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. at 422.
132. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37.
133. Id. It is unclear how rapidly existing 12-channel systems are being replaced by
larger systems. The owner of one large MSO claims that most remaining 12-channel
systems will be phased out by 1985. Id. By contrast, an industry analyst points out
that "existing systems, already borrowed-out to the hilt ... have been slow in ex-
panding their 12-channel systems." Loftus, supra note 115, at 78.
134. Noam, supra note 129, at 211.
135. Id.
136. For example, only one pay service is generally carried on a 12-channel system.
United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. at 422. In fact, the pro-
THE FCC AND "PAY CABLE"
If decisions about signal carriage are dictated by profitabil-
ity,137 the corporate links between system operators and pro-
gram suppliers may determine which services are offered,
regardless of the interests or preferences of subscribers. The
CNN dispute with Group W 138 is particularly significant, rais-
ing, as it does, questions as to whether corporate concerns may
restrict public access to a wide range of sources of news and
information.
A projected trend toward consolidation of cable operations in
the future suggests that this problem may increase. For exam-
ple, over the next decade, some large MSOs are expected to
expand, not by building new systems, but by "clustering,' 1 39 or
acquiring smaller systems located near affiliated systems. 4 °
This process of consolidation is expected to reduce the number
of MSOs that currently wire ninety percent of the nation's
cable homes' 4 ' from fifty to twenty-five. 4 2 Since it already ap-
pears to be very difficult to succeed in the pay cable market-
place without the large captive subscriber base an MSO
provides,43 as the number of MSOs declines, entry into the
pay industry will become even more difficult for unaffiliated
services. In addition, as the remaining MSOs increase in size
and market share, the advantages of affiliation, in both the ba-
sic and pay areas, should increase significantly.
V
A Plan for Divestiture
Because the effects of vertical integration are so profound,
and because the cable industry is likely to become increasingly
concentrated, cable policy must be changed to ensure that
cable continues to offer its viewers diverse sources of program-
ming and information. One suggested alternative is to make
gramming demand in a 12-channel system is almost exclusively for broadcast signals.
WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 37. Adding a pay service to an existing
system may require a system to pay up to $150 per subscriber for converters. Loftus,
supra note 115, at 78.
137. Noam, supra note 129, at 211.
138. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
139. Landro, Changing Channels: Cable-TV Bidding War to Serve Large Cities is
Quickly Cooling Off, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
140. Id. at 1, 12.
141. Id. at 1.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
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the cable industry a common carrier,1' open to all services on
a first-come, first-served basis.14 One observer speculated that
the CNN suit against Group W146 may ultimately have been
brought in order to bring some form of limited common carrier
status to the cable industry.1 47 However, common carrier sta-
tus would favor services presenting themselves early, 48 and it
would appear that forcing cable systems to act as common car-
riers is beyond the FCC's authority. 4 9
An alternative approach would be to prohibit MSOs from in-
volvement in cable programming, and to require any party
with interests in both an MSO and a program service to dis-
pose of one or the other.150 Such an action would not be with-
out precedent. The FCC already requires television network
affiliates in major markets to devote one hour of prime time
each night to nonnetwork programming,' 5' and prohibits net-
works from syndicating the programs they have broadcast." 2
144. Noam, supra note 129, at 216-24.
145. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701-02 (1979).
146. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
147. Brewin, supra note 115, at 19.
148. Noam, supra note 129, at 221.
149. "The Commission may not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as
it may not impose [common carrier] obligations on television broadcasters. We think
authority to compel cable operators to provide common carriage of public-originated
transmissions must come specifically from Congress." FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 U.S. at 708-09. This reasoning should also preclude requiring cable operators to
provide common carriage of commercially-originated transmissions of cable
programming.
150. Superficially, the case for divestiture appears more compelling for pay cable
than for basic cable services. The vertical integration in the pay industry is more per-
vasive. Compare supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text (discussing pay cable)
with supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text (discussing basic cable). Moreover,
the pay cable industry can be very lucrative, see supra note 60, and this fact reduces
the financial justification for permitting a service to rely on affiliation with a large MSO
for access to its subscribers. By contrast, basic services are generally not yet profita-
ble, see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text, and are very expensive to launch, id.,
which would appear to justify affiliation between a service and a large MSO. But see
infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. Finally, most systems carry only one or a
handful of pay services. See United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F.
Supp. at 422. This situation further increases the problems an unaffiliated pay service
faces in gaining access to a system. Nevertheless, the problem of cable operators' re-
stricting subscriber access to news and information sources, see supra notes 123-28 and
accompanying text, has such serious implications for the free flow of ideas as to man-
date divestiture for basic, as well as pay, services.
151. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1983).
152. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j). Efforts to repeal this regulation have apparently failed,
thanks, in part at least, to the personal intervention of President Reagan. Landro &
Saddler, Czar Wars: Network, Film Moguls Blitz Capital in Battle for TV Rerun Profits,
Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
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An even more compelling precedent for requiring the separa-
tion of program production from exhibition concerns the con-
sent decrees under which the major motion picture studios
were required to divest themselves of their interests in movie
theaters.153 If it was inappropriate in 1950 for Warner Brothers
to produce, distribute, and exhibit its own films,1 4 it should be
equally inappropriate in 1983 for Warner Communications to
control a major studio that produces films, 55 to have interests
in pay cable services that distribute films to cable systems, 1 6
and to control a large MSO that delivers films to home
audiences. 15
7
153. In July 1938, the United States commenced an action against eight film studios:
Paramount, Loew's, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox, Warner Brothers, RKO, Columbia,
United Artists, and Universal, charging a conspiracy to violate the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Partmar Corp., 97 F. Supp. 552, 554
(S.D. Cal. 1951). The first five defendants owned or controlled theaters, the other three
did not. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 140 (1948). The former
group consented to a consent decree entered in November 1940. Paramount Pictures
Corp. v. Partmar Corp., 97 F. Supp. at 554. In 1944, after the three-year period in which
the decree was effective, the government sought to modify the decree. Id. Hearings
were held and the court filed a written opinion, reported in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). The court's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law are reported in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1946). The Supreme Court affirmed each of these decisions in part and re-
versed each in part. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131. In light of
the Supreme Court's decision, a second consent decree was entered on March 3, 1949.
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Partmar Corp., 97 F. Supp. at 554. When six defendants
did not consent, additional hearings were held and the court entered a decree substan-
tially similar to the second decree entered in United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881. The Supreme Court refused to set aside the judgments in United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, and affirmed the judments in:
Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc. v. United States, 339 U.S. 974, reh'g denied, 340 U.S. 857
(1950); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. United States, 339 U.S. 974, reh'g denied,
340 U.S. 857 (1950); United States v. Loew's Inc., 339 U.S. 974, reh'g denied, 340 U.S. 857
(1950). See also United States v. Loew's Inc., Rept. 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH), 62,573,
62,765, 62,861. The Justice Department is currently reevaluating the consent decrees,
and informed sources "speculate that some of the teeth will be taken out of the 35-
year-old law." Robbins, Age of 'Consent' May Be Drawing to Close, Variety, July 13,
1983, at 5, col. 5.
154. Warner Brothers owned two chains of theaters, and was required to divest it-
self of both. Rept. 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,573.
155. Warner Brothers is a subsidiary of Warner Communications and produces and
distributes films. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 24-27.
156. Warner Communications formerly owned half of The Movie Channel, id. at 37,
and is now a participant in the Showtime/The Movie Channel combination, see Wall
St. J., Aug. 15, 1983, at 8, col. 1.
157. WARNER COMMUNICATIONS, INC., supra note 2, at 34. The argument implicitly
developed-that vertical integration is most meaningful when it encompasses exhibi-
tion, see infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text-does not have much popularity
among contemporary regulators. Thus, the Justice Department's primary concern
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In a leading consent decree case, the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed the question of whether vertical integration created mo-
nopoly by considering "the nature of the market to be served
... , and the leverage on the market which the particular ver-
tical integration creates or makes possible."'158 Applying this
standard, the need for separating program creation from pro-
gram exhibition may be even more critical for cable than it was
for movies or network broadcasting. The cable system in any
area functions as a natural monopoly, with the operator exer-
cising virtually complete control over what services are avail-
able to subscribers.5 9 By contrast, there are three competing
commercial television networks, a public network, and, in
larger cities, one or more independent television stations. Sim-
ilarly, at the time of the consent decrees, there were independ-
ent theaters not owned by major studios, and not all studios
owned theaters. 160 Thus, the cable operator has, in theory, far
greater power to restrict public access to information and en-
tertainment than either the television networks prior to the
prime time access' 6' and network syndication rules,'62 or the
major movie studios prior to the consent decrees. 163
Requiring cable operators to divest themselves of their inter-
ests in cable programming would affect the supply of cable pro-
gramming only temporarily, if at all. Although there might be
some initial reluctance to embark on cable programming with-
out any assurance of access to the subscribers of a large MSO,
this would quickly be dispelled by the realization that each
service had equal access to each cable system, and that pro-
gram carriage decisions were being made on their merits.
Moreover, a significant amount of basic cable programming is
with the proposed Showtime/The Movie Channel merger was that the film studios in-
volved would prevent competing pay services from obtaining movies on a competitive
basis, or, at least, would "jack up the prices ... to license movies to pay TV services."
Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1983, at 8, col. 1. This argument would be misdirected even if HBO
were not itself the single largest financier of American movies. Mayer, supra note 5, at
1. The potential for interference with free market forces is far greater with cable deliv-
ery, which is done without competition, see supra notes 128-42 and accompanying text,
than with film production or distribution, which are highly competitive. See, e.g., Film
Production Chart, Variety, Aug. 24, 1983, at 32 (listing 19 fim production companies,
excluding independents, and seven distributors).
158. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 174.
159. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
160. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. at 164.
161. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
163. See generally supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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already being provided by services without links to MSOs; 1 6 4 in
view of cable's enormous profit potential, particularly as the
number of wired homes increases, 165 there would certainly be
no shortage of entrants into the cable programming field.
V
Conclusion
In the decades since the FCC moved to protect pay cable
from rate regulation, the cable industry has changed so dra-
matically that the Commission's pay cable policies need a thor-
ough reexamination. Much of the diversity in cable
programming is provided not by pay cable but by basic serv-
ices, which will develop more successfully in a regulated than
in an unregulated environment. "Protecting" these services
from rate regulation may actually hinder their development
and the diversity they can bring. Accordingly, the FCC should
modify its definition of pay cable to permit local regulation of
the rates for basic services. More generally, the Commission
164. Getty Oil owns ESPN. BROADCASTING, Jan. 4, 1982, at 58. Turner Broadcasting
owns CNN and CNN Headline. Id. at 71. Hearst Corporation and ABC Video jointly
own ARTS. BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 42. Many other basic cable services are
apparently not affiliated with MSOs. See BROADCASTING, May 3, 1982, at 50-54 (discuss-
ing basic services). Getty, MCA, Paramont, Twentieth-Century Fox, and Columbia
Pictures attempted to start Premiere, the pay service enjoined in United States v. Co-
lumbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412. None of the corporate entities dis-
cussed in this footnote is a major MSO. See BROADCASTING, June 13, 1983, at 68 (list of
top 50 MSOs).
165. Paycable revenues will skyrocket to $16.3 billion and outstrip theatrical
boxoffice receipts by a margin of three-to-one by 1990, the RCA Corp. predicts
in its annual report.
The findings of a joint RCA/NBC entertainment task force also show that
cable's total gross income from systems, plus ad-supported and pay networks,
will pull to within $1.3 billion of the revenue earned by broadcast networks,
their affiliates and independent stations ....
The company forecasts that 1982's paycable revenues will leap from $2.1 bil-
lion and grow 37% a year to the $16.3-billion level by 1990. The calculations
include spending for pay-per-view events, but no precise breakout was noted
in the report and a company spokesman said no separate numbers were avail-
able ....
The biggest change in ad-supported tv, RCA says, will come in local cable
systems, super stations and national cable networks. The 1982 revenue of
$200,000,000 will increase 43% a year to close out the decade at $3.5 billion ....
By the decade's end total spending for basic, ad-supported and paycable is
projected to total $27.5-billion.
Girard, RCA Study Sees Pay TV Passing Films by 1990, Variety, Mar. 30, 1983, at 1, col.
1, and 124. But see BROADCASTING, July 23, 1984, at 108, for evidence that the growth of
pay cable may now be slowing rather than accelerating.
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should recognize that its protective attitude toward pay cable
may no longer be appropriate. In view of the cable industry's
increasing vertical integration, in some instances it may be the
public, rather than the industry, that needs the Commission's
protection. Limiting pay cable's rate exemption to subscriber-
supported services and prohibiting simultaneous ownership of
cable systems and program services would be two useful steps
toward making cable the vehicle for the diverse and innovative
programming that the FCC has long envisioned.
